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Abstract 

The standard approach to modeling intertemporal consumption is to assume that consumers are solving a dynamic optimization problem. Under realistic descriptions of utility and uncertainty—stochastic income and habit formation-- these intertemporal problems are very difficult to solve. Optimizing agents must build up precautionary savings to buffer bad income realizations, and must anticipate the negative “internality” of current consumption on future utility, through habits. Yet recent empirical evidence has shown that consumption behavior of the average household in society conforms fairly well to the prescriptions of the optimal solution. This paper establishes potential ways in which consumers can attain near-optimal consumption behavior despite their mathematical and computational limitations in solving the complicated optimization problem. Individual and social learning mechanisms are proposed to be one possible link. Using an experimental approach, results show that by incorporating social learning and individual learning into the intertemporal consumption framework, participants’ actual spending behavior converged effectively towards optimal consumption. While consumers persistently spend too much in early periods, they learn rapidly from their own experience (and “socially learn” from experience of others) to consume amounts close to optimal levels. Their spending is much more closely linked to optimal consumption (conditional on earlier spending) than to rule-of-thumb spending of current income or cash-on-hand. Despite their approximate optimality, consumers exhibit dramatic “loss-aversion” by strongly avoiding consumption levels which create negative levels of period-by-period utility (even when optimal utility is negative). The relative ratio of actual utilities to optimal utilities, for positive utility compared to negative, is 2.63. This coefficient is remarkably close to the coefficient of loss-aversion documented in a wide variety of risky and riskless choice domains, which shows that even when consumption is nearly-optimal, behavioral influences sharply affect decisions. 


1. Introduction 
 
This paper explores how well participants make savings and spending decisions in a 30-period experimental environment. The environment is challenging because future income is uncertain, and the utility from consumption is lowered by previous consumption habits. If participants spend too much in early periods, they will have too little precautionary savings to buffer them against bad income outcomes, and they will build up expensive habits which reduce future utilities. 

The results are of interest because there is little agreement on how well consumers optimize savings and consumption over the life cycle in naturally-occurring settings. Until the 1990’s, most models assumed consumers solved a dynamic programming problem under assumptions about uncertainty and utility which are unrealistic (e.g., replacing stochastic future income with a certainty-equivalent; see Carroll, 2001, for a recent summary). The fact that actual savings patterns are not consistent with the predictions of these models is irrelevant if the assumptions of those models do not match the world in which consumers live.

Beginning with Zeldes (1989), economists began to solve intertemporal consumption problems which are more lifelike, and also more complex. A revisionist view has emerged which suggests that many aspects of household savings behavior which look mistaken, compared to optimal saving in simpler models, actually conforms fairly well to the optimal solution of the more realistic new-generation models (Deaton, 1991; Carroll, 1997; Cagetti, 2003; Gourinchas and Parker, 2002). But this conclusion is perplexing because solving the models is extremely difficult. How can consumers who are often ignorant about basic principles of financial planning (e.g., Bernheim 1998) be reaching reasonable savings decisions in environments so complex that clever economists could not solve the models until a few years ago?​[1]​ 

One possibility is that consumers learn how much to save. While learning has been widely studied in game theory​[2]​, macroeconomics​[3]​ and finance​[4]​, there has been surprisingly little work on learning about intertemporal consumption (e.g., Ballinger et. al., in press; Allen and Carroll, 2001). Similarly, there is little experimental work on how well participants optimize dynamically. 

Allen and Carroll (2001) explored the proposition that good consumption rules can be learned through experience. Using computer simulations, they show that consumers could learn a good consumption rule using trial-and-error, but only if they have simulated consumers  to have large amounts of experience (roughly a million years of model time). They suggested social learning, in which consumers learn from the consumption-saving decisions of others, could be a faster mechanism because information from many consumers can be available at the same time. However, it is well-known that social learning can create convergence to sub-optimal behavior. For example, Bikhchandani et al. (1998) and Gale (1996) show how social learning can lead to ‘informational cascades’ or ‘herd behavior’, if agents ‘ignore’ their own information and simply imitate the behavior of others. Therefore, social learning mechanisms are not guaranteed to lead to optimal savings.

This paper explores learning of savings-consumption decisions using experimental techniques. The approach allows tight control over participant’s preferences and beliefs about future uncertain income. As a result, we can compute precisely what optimizing agents should be doing, and see how far actual participants deviate from optimality. By repeating the 30-period `lifetimes” several times, and providing social learning information about decisions of others, we can also see how well participants learn from their own experience and learn socially from experiences of others. The experimental design is not meant to closely mimic how actual people might learn (since you only live once), but simply to investigate whether several lifetimes of learning—and learning from lifecycle savings of others—could conceivably lead to optimality.  If the experiments show that convergence to optimality is slow, even in this relatively simple setting with many lifetimes of experience, that lends credence to skepticism about how well optimality is likely to result when average people learn within one lifetime. On the other hand, if learning is reasonably fast under some conditions, that suggests further exploration of whether the conditions which facilitate learning apply to average consumers. 

Earlier experiments found that people are bad at dynamic optimization (e.g., Kotlikoff, Johnson and Samuelson, 2001). Fehr and Zych (1998) studied an experimental environment in which players develop habits which reduce future utility (as in models of addiction, and some specifications of consumer utility​[5]​). Their participants do not appreciate the negative “internality” created by early consumption on future utility, so they consume too much in early periods relative to optimal consumption. Ballinger et al. (in press98) studied social learning in intertemporal consumption experiments with income uncertainty, by allowing participants to give verbal advice to others. They find that social learning helps actual spending decisions converge towards optimality, but substantial deviations remain. 

Our experimental design combines the income uncertainty in Ballinger et al’s experiment and the habit formation in Fehr and Zych’s design in a synthesis that has not been studied in previous experiments. Both features imply that participants should save a lot in early periods. Saving early builds up precautionary savings which prevents consumption from being drastically reduced if future income draws are bad, and also limits costly habit formation which reduces future utility.   

In the experiment, participants are in one of two conditions, with and without social learning.  Social learning is implemented in a simple way, by telling participants about the savings decisions and outcomes of earlier participants whose overall utility outcomes were either very high, very low, or randomly chosen. In their first 30-period sequence, participants in the no-social-learning condition overspend and fall far short of optimality. However, we find that both individual earning across seven 30-period sequences, and “social learning” from exposure to other participants’ behavior, are sufficient to bring savings decisions surprisingly close to optimal. The results show that it is possible for people in a well-structured, but complex environment to approximate optimality under special learning conditions. (Whether these conditions correspond to how learning occurs over peoples’ lifetimes is a separate question, which we return to in the conclusion.) Consumption decisions are much more closely correlated with optimal decisions than with rule-of-thumb spending of a fixed fraction of either current income or current cash-on-hand. At the same time, subjects exhibit sharp aversion to making consumption decisions which result in negative period-by-period utilities. The extent to which they dislike making choices that lead to negative utilities is surprisingly close to the same degree of aversion to losses documented in many other studies of both riskless choices (e.g, Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler, 1990) and risky choices (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Benartzi and Thaler, 1995) and which is corroborated by brain evidence showing separate processing of gains and losses (e.g., O’Doherty et al, in press).

Section 1 below describes theories of intertemporal consumption in the environment used in the experiments. Section 2 describes the experimental design and how social learning was implemented. Section 3 presents the results. Section 4 concludes and includes some ideas for future research.  

2.  Optimal Intertemporal Consumption

Economists have only recently been able to solve intertemporal consumption problems under realistic descriptions of utility and uncertainty. These problems do not have analytical solutions, and hence were difficult to solve numerically without fast computing. In the period before 1990 or so, economists solved more tractable versions of the model in which consumers either had unrealistic preferences (quadratic utility), or had plausible preferences (constant relative risk aversion– CRRA) but faced no income uncertainty. 

The Certainty Equivalent (CEQ) model, which uses quadratic utility functions, has been tested exhaustively but the implications of the model do not fit well with empirical evidence (see Deaton, 1992 for a summary). For example, the CEQ model provides no explanation for one of the central findings from household wealth surveys: The median household at every age before 50 typically holds total non-housing net assets worth somewhere between only a few weeks of income, when the CEQ model predicts that households will have more precautionary savings than that (a few months worth; see Carroll (1997)). Failure of the CEQ model in explaining this and other empirical regularities have led economists before 1990 to conclude that consumers were irrationally saving too little.. 

Ironically, when dramatic improvements in computational speed finally permitted numerical solutions to the realistic intertemporal consumption problem, many apparent rejections of rationality turned out to be consistent with dynamic optimization. This gave rise to the Buffer Stock Savings Model (Zeldes, 1989; Deaton, 1991). Under plausible combinations of parameter values, optimizing consumers should hold buffer-stocks of liquid assets equivalent to a few weeks or months’ worth of consumption, and once the target wealth is achieved to set consumption on average equal to average income (Carroll, 1997). Other empirical regularities that were rejected by the CEQ model also turned out to be consistent with the buffer stock savings model (see Carroll, 2001). 

The Buffer Stock Savings Model was used for this experiment. The specification largely follows Carroll, Overland and Weil (2000), with some changes to accommodate an experimental design. 

Consumers earn (stochastic) income in 30 periods, which they divide between savings and consumption. Lifetime utility is the discounted sum of (CRRA) utility in each period. The utility of consumption in a period depends on the ratio of consumption to the consumer’s habit, which is a depreciated sum of previous consumption. The consumer’s goal is to maximize the discounted utility from consumption over the remainder of his life, a standard dynamic programming problem. The variables used are as follows:

	- Time preference factor (assumed constant)
	- Total cash/resources available in period s (‘cash on hand’)
	- Savings in period s (portion of Xs not consumed)
	- Consumption in period s
R	- Gross interest rate each period
	- Habit stock from period s-1
	- Utility 
	- Actual income in period s
	- Permanent labor income in period s
	- = 1 + gs, where gs is the growth rate of permanent income each period.
	- Stochastic income shock in period s

The consumer’s maximization problem is

	(1)

subject to the usual constraints (see below).​[6]​  Constant relative risk-aversion (CRRA) utility is assumed, and adjusted for habit formation as follows:

	(2)

ρ is the coefficient of relative risk aversion, and γ indexes the importance of habits (if γ=0 the habit variable disappears). The utility function used in the experiments is a small modification of this one to bound payoffs from below. ​[7]​ Following Fehr and Zych (1998), the habit stock of consumption evolves according to , where is a depreciation rate (equal to .3 in the experiment).  To make computation easier, it is convenient to define = and normalize variables by dividing by permanent income Pt ​[8]​ (lower-case variables are the normalized versions of upper-case ones). This leads to a recursive specification of the value of current and future utility which is a function of only two state variables, cash-on-hand xt and the habit level ht-1. The optimal value function is

	(3)

Subject to constraints

   (with )	(4)
	(5)
	(6)
 
Note that participants are liquidity-constrained and cannot borrow (i.e., st>0). 

In the last period of the finite life T, the solution is easy because the consumer lives “large” and spends everything (we assume no bequest motive), so cT = xT.  In the second-to-last period of life, the consumer’s goal is to maximize the sum of utility from consumption in period T-1 and the mathematical expectation of utility from consumption in period T, taking into account the uncertainty that results from the possible shocks to future income yT, and the habit stock that builds up from consumption.  For a grid of many possible state variable values {x T-1, h T-2}, equation (3) is used to find the optimal  value (for each state variable vector) that yields the highest current and discounted future utility. An approximate optimal consumption function for period T-1 is then constructed by interpolation. The same steps can be repeated to construct a consumption rule for periods T-2, T-3, and so on back to period 1. 

Before solving the model, more parameters values have to be specified. Actual income each period is equal to permanent income multiplied by an income shock, . Using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, Carroll (1992) and his subsequent papers find income shocks to be lognormally distributed with a mean value of one and a standard deviation of 0.2. In this experiment, η therefore follows a lognormal distribution . This gives a mean income shock . An inflated standard deviation σ = 1 was used rather than .2, to create more income uncertainty and make the need for precautionary savings greater. (The idea is to make the experimental environment more challenging for individuals, to give social and personal learning more scope to have an effect.)  Permanent income grows each period according to (initialized at =100). In this experiment, income growth is constant at 5% each period (). The discount factor and gross interest rate were both set equal to one ().  The risk-aversion coefficient is ρ=3, a reasonable empirical estimate often used in consumption studies.  For habit formation, we choose a moderate value of γ = 0.6 and modest depreciation  (and set the starting value of habit =10). These figures ensure that the effect of habit formation is strong and persistent (habits depreciate slowly) to make the problem more challenging. 


Numerical Approximations to Optimal Consumption Functions

This section describes the numerical procedure and illustrates some of the properties of optimal consumption. Using the normalized equation (3), Mathematica was used to solve for the optimal consumption functions (as multiples of permanent income) for each period of the finite life. From this function, the optimal can be calculated for a particular period given actual values of current cash-on-hand xt and habit ht-1.  can then be calculated by multiplying  by permanent income.  

Figure 1 shows the optimal consumption ratio  in period 30 as a function of the cash-on-hand ratio (xt) and habit stock ratio (ht-1). Since optimality requires consuming everything in the last period, optimal consumption equals cash-on-hand (= xt). 

Figure 2 shows optimal consumption in period 29. An optimizing consumer takes into account two things: the possibility of a bad income draw in the last period, and the effect current spending has on the habit stock, which in turn affects future utility. The result is that consumption should generally be lower than cash-on-hand. If the habit stock is low, the consumption ratio should only be a fraction of the cash-on-hand ratio (i.e., the consumer should still save in period 29). Even when the habit stock is high (around 4 in Figure 2) the consumer should be spending only half as much as the cash-on-hand. 

As the consumer works backward to the first period, the conservative spending which is optimal in period 29 becomes more and more conservative. Figure 3 shows optimal consumption in period 1. Optimizers spend very conservatively: Even if the cash-on-hand ratio is 8, they should spend only about .2 if habit is low, and no more than 1 if habit is high.  

Figure 4 below illustrates the optimal path of consumption, and cumulative cash-on-hand, given a particular sequence of income shocks drawn randomly from the lognormal distribution. This is a crucial figure because it shows how much consumers should save in early periods (the gap between the Optimal Consumption line and the Cash-on-hand line is savings) and how large a cash reserve they should amass. In the example the cash-on-hand rises to 1500 in period 20, which is ten times the mean income of about 150.  Remember that savings builds up a buffer stock of cash, and limits the rise in the habit variable that lowers future utility from consumption. Although permanent income grows at 5% each period in the experiment, the lognormal distribution produces wild fluctuations in income which optimal savers should anticipate. Consumers should brace themselves for a rainy day by saving until about period 20, then start to dissave by spending more than their current income (i.e., the consumption line is usually above the dotted income line after period 20 or so), dipping into their cash-on-hand. 

3.  Experimental Design

Participants were carefully instructed about the basic concepts of the experiment, and how their decisions and the random income draws would determine how much money they earn (see Appendix for details and tables). Microsoft Excel was used to generate a user-friendly interface for the intertemporal consumption experiment. In each period, the program displays the income shock obtained, the corresponding cash available and the habit stock. The program calculates and displays the possible points that can be obtained from different levels of spending (i.e., utilities) and the corresponding savings available for the next period. Participants can input different consumption amounts and see how much utility they will earn, and how much cash they will have left in the next period. Most participants tried out several spending choices before making a decision (especially in the first couple of sequences) This process is repeated until the end of the sequence or ‘lifetime’ of 30 periods. Each participant’s total payoff was a preannounced linear function of the total points earned in all sequences ​[9]​ plus a $5 showup fee.  

To facilitate comprehension and avoid demand effects, economic jargon like ‘income shocks’, ‘habit stock’, and ‘utility’, were translated into plain language-- ‘adjustment factor’, ‘lifestyle index’ and ‘points’ respectively.

The instructions stated that the income shocks or ‘adjustment factors’ followed a lognormal distribution, and also gave samples of 30 shocks to give participants a feel for how much their income could vary. Participants had one table illustrating how the habit stock in each period was determined by the previous period’s habit stock and the current spending, and a separate table showing how their spending and habit stock in one period determined their utility points in that period. The Excel program automatically spent all remaining cash in period 30, so participants knew their savings would not roll over from one 30-period ‘lifetime’ sequence to the next sequence.  

To ensure that participants understood the instructions, they were required to complete and correctly answer a quiz before they started their experiment. The quiz tested them on how their choices, habit levels, and income shocks would determine utility points. The quiz is designed to allay concerns that poor consumption decisions arise from confusion. 

Participants in the social learning condition were given three additional tables. The tables looked like the screens the participants had, showing income each period, cash-on-hand, spending decisions, and points from each period of a 30-period sequence.  One table was the actual result from a previous participant who had earned the highest level of points in the experiment (without social learning); another table was from a participant who earned the lowest level of points; and the third table was chosen randomly.  The income shocks in these three tables were different from the income shocks the social learning participants would later observe, so they could not just imitate directly what the high-point-earning participant had done. 

There are many ways to implement social learning (e.g., Ballinger et al, in press, used direct verbal communication). Our method is gentle because it does not give participants too much information. The goal is to mimic something like intergenerational advice-giving in which a parent points out three role models—a great success who retires wealthy, a ne’er-do-well who ends up broke, and an average Joe. Keep in mind that  the participants who earn the most points might do so by making poor decisions but getting lucky income draws (and vice versa, for the low-point person). Hence, to infer a good consumption function participants must be able to distinguish good decisions from good outcomes. So it is by no means clear that social learning will have much effect. The high-achieving role models they are presented with could be subjects who overspent (relative to the optimum) but got lucky by receiving high income draws, and hence earned a lot of utility points through luck rather than skill.  

Participants were 35 undergraduates from the National University of Singapore (NUS) and 37 undergraduates from California Institute of Technology​[10]​. These students are unusually adept at analytical thinking so they may represent an upper bound on how well average consumers can solve these intertemporal optimization problems. The participants were recruited using the universities’ mail servers. Half the participants (18 from each school) did the experiment without social learning and half (17 NUS, 19 Caltech) had social learning information. Each group had seven sequences (or “lifetimes”) of 30 periods of income draws. To simplify data analysis, within each condition all participants had the same income draws (but the draws were different in the two conditions). Most participants completed the instruction and seven sequences in about 90 minutes. 

4.  Experimental Results

The analysis of results is divided into four parts. The first part compares the actual total point outcome that participants obtained in each sequence, relative to the optimal level of points that could have been obtained given their income realizations. The second part presents a series of graphs that examines whether aggregate actual spending behavior (for each sequence) conforms well to the optimal spending path, conditional on the previous spending decisions participants made. The third part is a regression analysis that shows how rapidly learning occurs and finds some differences among groups. The fourth part explores some behavioral explanations for departures from optimality.

a. Comparing Actual Point Outcomes to Optimal outcomes

Table 1 below presents the summary statistics of actual point outcomes of the 36 participants in each of the two social learning conditions. The first row (“Optimal Points”) of each condition shows how much an optimizing agent would have earned given the income shocks. This is the unconditional optimum—that is, it does not account for the fact that if a participant deviated from optimality in early periods, their later consumption should adjust for what they did earlier.  

The second row (“Average Total Points”) gives the average of total sequence points across the 36 participants in each condition. The third row is the standard deviation of this average. The fourth row is the difference between the average total points and the optimal total points. The fifth row is the total income in each sequence. It is included to give an idea of whether deviations from optimality are due to bad savings decisions or unlucky income shocks.​[11]​

Results show that participants who had little or no prior experience in the intertemporal consumption experiment (and no social learning) performed poorly with respect to the optimum. This can be clearly seen from row 4, in the top panel of Table 1 below. The deviation of average total sequence points from the optimal is hugely negative for sequence one (-436) and sequence two (-613) without social learning.

If individual learning is powerful in bringing spending decisions to the optimal, we should see two patterns. First, the deviation from optimality (in row 4) should converge towards zero as participants play more sequences. Second, the standard deviation of the average total points (row 3) should fall as more and more participants learn to optimize.  



 Table 1: Summary Statistics of Actual Point Outcomes.
Sequence	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Without Social Learning
1) Optimal Points	554	560	531	555	353	542	544
2) Average Total Points	118	-53	224	450	-65	435	440
3) Standard Deviation	635	694	498	297	475	255	146
4) Deviation from Optimum	-436	-613	-307	-105	-417	-107	-104
5) Total Income	5471	7083	5215	6235	4300	4571	4789
With Social Learning
1) Optimal Points	454	598	550	590	429	502	471
2) Average Total Points	325	586	559	589	309	539	504
3) Standard Deviation	238	54	93	62	255	73	47
4) Deviation from Optimum	-128	-12	9	-1	-120	36	34
5) Total Income	4342	5416	5224	5901	4193	5344	5050

The top panel of Table 1 (without social learning) shows both patterns: The deviation in points from optimality falls steadily from about 400 points to 100 points, and the standard deviation across participants shrinks. Point totals dip in sequence five (and the standard deviation rises), when participants had unusually bad income shocks.  However, in the subsequent sequences 6-7 where the income draws only improved a little, the deviations and the standard deviation are low, which implies that participants learned from the bad sequence 5 how to make better decisions
 in the face of bad income draws. 
The bottom panel of Table 1 shows that social learning brings point outcomes much closer to the optimum rapidly, in the first couple of sequences. The standard deviation around the average point total is also much lower, showing that most participants learn rapidly from the social learning examples.

b. Deviation of Actual Spending Path from the Conditional Optima

The unconditional optimal level of spending each period assumes that optimal spending decisions were made in all previous periods; it is independent of participants’ actual cash-on-hand and habit stock in the current period. The conditional optimal spending level each period is a function of the participant’s actual cash-on-hand and habit stock. It therefore takes into account the possibility that sub-optimal spending decisions were made in previous periods when calculating the optimal spending for the current period.

For each participant, the conditional deviation for each period is the difference between actual spending and the optimum (conditioned on each participant’s earlier decisions).  The average conditional deviation each period averages over the 36 participants. Figure 5 below plots the average conditional deviation paths for sequences 1 and 7 without social learning. Remember that the income draws for Sequence 1 were different from the income draws of Sequence 7. The optimal path in Figure 5 is the horizontal axis at zero. Ninety-five percent confidence intervals are shown (dotted lines) to let the reader see at a glance whether the average conditional deviation is significantly different from zero.

Figure 5 confirms the conclusion from Table 1: Without social learning, participants in sequence 1 are spending too much in early periods.  (The fact that the confidence intervals do not include the zero horizontal axis means the effect is highly significant until the last few periods, when the standard deviations become very large). Figure 5 also shows how well participants learned to consume optimally over time. The sequence 7 conditional deviations are close to zero and the 95% confidence intervals overlap the zero-deviation axis in all periods except the last few (where the standard deviations are large). (In fact, actual spending path is insignificantly different from the conditional optima by sequence 5.)

Figure 6 is the conditional deviations for sequences 1 and 7 for participants in the social learning condition.  Deviations in sequence 1 are much smaller than the corresponding deviations in Figure 5 (though they are still highly significantly different from zero). Curiously, there is little difference between sequences 1 and 7 in the social learning condition. (Indeed, the sequence 7 deviations are much larger, and more significantly different from zero, than the corresponding sequence 7 deviations in the no-social-learning condition.) It is possible that social learning caused an informational cascade onto a consumption 
rule which is not far from optimal, but which displaced the powerful individual learning across sequences visible in Figure 5.

c. Regression Analysis 

This section of the analysis uses regressions to analyze formally the impact individual learning and social learning mechanisms have on the deviation of actual spending behavior from the conditional optima. 

The conditional deviations for each period, sequence, and participant, were used as separate data points​[12]​. The dependent variable is the log of the absolute conditional deviation from optimality.  A negative coefficient means a variable lowers the deviation from optimality (which is a good thing). Because of the decreased uncertainty in future income as more periods are played, participants should be able to make better decisions with respect to the conditional optimal. A negative coefficient is therefore expected for the period variable. The “period squared” variable simply takes into account any possible non-linearity that the period variable may have on the conditional deviation and it may have either sign. 

Independent variables are self-explanatory except for dummy variables: “Social Learning” is 1 in the social learning condition, “Caltech” is 1 for Caltech participants, “Female” is 1 for females (43% of the participants), and “Chinese” is 1 for Chinese students (50%) (included because Singaporean Chinese have one of the highest savings rates in the world).​[13]​ Dummies for sequences 2-7 (using sequence 1 as the baseline) capture learning across sequences. Participant fixed effects were included to control for individual differences, which are substantial. 

Model (3) includes the demographic dummies (and drops the insignificant Caltech variable) and seems to fit the data best. The null hypothesis of homoscedasticity in residuals cannot be rejected at the 5% level in all three models, and the R2’s are reasonable at around 30%.

Table 2: Regression of log(absolute conditional deviation) (t-statistics in parentheses)
	Model (1)	Model (2)	Model (3)
Social Learning	-0.8254**(-7.63)	-0.7097**(-9.28)	-0.7275**(-6.73)
Sequence 2	-0.1977**(-5.86)	-0.1977**(-5.86)	-0.1977**(-5.86)
Sequence 3	-0.4023**(-11.93)	-0.4023**(-11.93)	-0.4023**(-11.93)
Sequence 4	-0.3549**(-10.53)	-0.3549**(-10.53)	-0.3549**(-10.53)
Sequence 5	-0.4893**(-14.52)	-0.4893**(-14.52)	-0.4894**(-14.52)
Sequence 6	-0.5339**(-15.81)	-0.5339**(-15.81)	-0.5330**(-15.81)
Sequence 7	-0.5619**(-16-67)	-0.5619**(-16-67)	-0.5619**(-16.67)
Period	0.1305**(29.27)	0.1305**(29.27)	0.1305**(29.27)
Period Squared	-0.0019**(-12.93)	-0.0019**(-12.93)	-0.0019**(-12.93)
Caltech	-	0.0322(0.30)	-
Female	-	0.5274**(4.88)	0.4244**(2.78)
Chinese	-	0.2124**(2.78)	-0.3648**(-3.37)
Constant	2.408**(28.59)	1.668**(12.17)	2.349**(17.14)
R²	0.312	0.333	0.331
*p<.05; ** p<.01




The regression shows that social learning has a large negative (deviation-reducing) effect, as expected from the results described above. Since the dependent variable is the logged conditional deviation, the coefficient means that social learning causes an approximately 73% reduction in conditional deviation, relative to when social learning is absent. 

The coefficients on the sequence dummy variables are also significant and negative. Table 2 suggests that learning mostly takes place in the first three sequences (since the coefficients for later sequences are not
very different from the sequence 4 coefficient).  The Period variable is, surprisingly, positive rather than
negative. This may be due to the fact that the absolute scale of deviations is larger in later periods because participants have more income and cash-on-hand, so deviations are simply larger. The pattern of coefficients on Period and Period2 shows that conditional deviations increase at a decreasing rate as more periods are played. Females appear to deviate more, and Chinese subjects less, than men and non-Chinese. The ethnicity effect is consistent with higher savings rates among Chinese. The gender effect could be due to less careful calculation among female participants or to some other source that could be explored in future research.

d. Behavioral models

The goal in behavioral economics is not just to document deviations from optimality, but to use those deviations to create more general theory that applies to a wide variety of settings (including reliable psychology experiments). A natural behavioral explanation for the common tendency to spend too much is a “rule of thumb” in which subjects simply spend a fixed fraction of their current income, or a fraction of cash-on-hand (e.g., Cochrane, 1989). To investigate these alternative explanations, we ran regressions in which the log of actual spending was regressed against the conditionally optimal level of consumption and either (a) current income; or (b) current cash-on-hand (i.e., current income plus savings). Regressions were run separately for each sequence, pooling across all subjects in each learning treatment. Since optimal spending is easier to compute in the last few periods (and highly correlated with cash-on-hand—e.g., in period 30 they are exactly the same) we excluded periods 28-30 (which did not materially affect the results). Fixed effects were included to adjust for the possibility that some subjects saved more than others. 

Table 3 summarizes the results. The results are surprising. Even though earlier analyses showed that subjects obviously overspend, especially in earlier sequences, the best model puts a very large weight (usually close to 1, and hugely significant) on the conditionally optimal level of spending and very little weight on either actual income or cash-on-hand. The incremental R-squared from adding the either of the rule-of-thumb variables (income, and cash-on-hand) to the conditionally optimal spending variable are small, often zero. In contrast, the incremental R-squared from adding conditionally optimal spending to each of the rule-of-thumb variables is typically quite large (around .6 for income and .2 for cash-on-hand). Of course, the independent variables are highly multicollinear (.2-.6 for income and .3-.9 for cash-on-hand) because all three variables increase across periods (which explain the spurious negative coefficients on the cash-on-hand variable). Nonetheless, the regressions clearly show that spending is better explained as a fraction of optimal spending rather than as a fraction of either income or cash-on-hand. These results do not imply that some behavioral model could not be found which would more accurately explain spending decisions as the result of some simplifying heuristic. But the simple idea that spending is a fraction of optimal spending is a compelling model, despite the deviations shown above. 

Table 3: Rule-of-thumb regression estimates
Regression Analysis: (Actual Spending) = β0 + β1Actual Income + β2Conditional Optimum + Fixed Effects  + ε
Pooled data for group without social learning						
sequence (1-7): 	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
Coef Actual Income	0.08	0.00	0.00	-0.01	-0.01	0.00	-0.01	
Coef Conditional Optimum	0.74	0.88	0.90	0.87	0.95	0.91	0.97	
R squared	0.85	0.88	0.89	0.92	0.90	0.92	0.92	
R-squared (cond. opt. only)	0.85	0.88	0.89	0.92	0.90	0.92	0.92	
								
Pooled data for group with social learning 						
sequence (1-7): 	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
Coef Actual Income	-0.02	0.00	-0.01	-0.02	-0.06	-0.06	-0.05	
Coef Conditional Optimum	0.85	0.95	0.88	0.92	0.94	0.93	0.97	
R squared	0.90	0.93	0.94	0.93	0.92	0.94	0.91	
R squared (cond. Opt. only)	0.89	0.93	0.94	0.92	0.92	0.93	0.91	
 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Note: All variables are logs except fixed effects. Periods 28-30 excluded.			
Conditional optimum coefficients are hugely significant in all sequences (t-statistics range from 49 to 111). 
								
Regression Analysis: Actual Spending = β0 + β1Cash-on-hand + β2Conditional Optimum + Fixed Effects + ε
Pooled data for group without social learning						
sequence (1-7): 	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
Coef Cash-on-hand	-0.24	-0.17	-0.14	-0.19	-0.19	-0.08	-0.12	
Coef Conditional Optimum	1.03	1.04	1.00	1.06	1.12	0.97	1.05	
R squared	0.86	0.89	0.89	0.93	0.91	0.92	0.92	
								
								
Pooled data for group with social learning 						
sequence (1-7): 	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
Coef Cash-on-hand	-0.35	-0.27	-0.38	-0.49	-0.43	-0.28	-0.66	
Coef Conditional Optimum	1.15	1.14	1.21	1.30	1.26	1.15	1.39	
R squared	0.91	0.94	0.95	0.95	0.94	0.95	0.95	
								
Note: All variables are logs except fixed effects. Periods 28-30 excluded.			
All coefficients highly significant in all sequences.					
R squared of cash-on-hand only model ranges from .52-.80 (without) and .58-.77 (with)		

Another concept in behavioral economics which might be relevant here is the idea that people are disproportionately averse to decisions that create nominal losses. Loss-aversion has been established in choice of risky gambles (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), in the dramatic gap between selling and buying prices (e.g., Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler, 1990), in labor supply (Camerer et al, 1997), in the tendency to hold money-losing stocks (Odean, 1998) and houses (Genesove and Mayer, 2001) too long, and has been used to explain the equity premium in stock returns (Benartzi and Thaler, 1995), “earnings management” which yields relatively few reported accounting losses in earnings (Degeorge, Patel and Zeckhauser, 1999) and other field phenomena (Camerer, 2000). 

To see whether subjects are averse to nominal utility losses, Figures 7a-b plot the actual utility gains or losses from spending decisions (the y-axes) against the gains or losses that would results from conditionally optimal spending (x-axes), pooling data from all subjects and sequences. Figure 7a shows
the majority of observations (where actual and conditionally optimal utilities are between -50 and +50, n=13,701), and Figure 7b shows all the data (n=14,616). 

If participants really dislike getting a negative experimental payoff in a period (as in Fehr and Zych, in press), there will be relatively few points in the bottom half of the scatterplot. Indeed, in Figure 7a, there is a very sharp dropoff in the frequency of observations at zero on the y-axis. Participants are apparently reluctant to make choices that yield negative utilities, even when conditionally optimal spending would require them to “lose” utility. (In those periods where optimality required participants to accept a negative utility payoff, they did so only 21% of the time.) A piecewise-linear jackknife regression is plotted on Figures 7a-b through the origin. This regression gives coefficients in the domain of positive (conditionally optimal) utilities of .86 and negative (conditionally optimal) utilities of .33. The ratio of these two slopes is 2.63. This crude coefficient of the relative willingness to accept losses, compared to the willingness to indulge gains, is remarkably close to the ratios of local loss and gain marginal utility (roughly 2-2.5) derived from many of the studies of loss-aversion cited in the previous paragraph.

Together with the analyses above, this result shows that while the best rule-of-thumb model is one in which subjects are approximately optimal, there is a dramatic aversion to choices that create “losses” in utility. This aversion to earning a negative number in one period​[14]​ is important because it suggests that the way in which consumption choices were mapped into utilities—which is an artifact of the experimental design—could affect the deviation from optimality. By altering the affine transformation from economic outcomes into nominal payoffs, it is conceivable that subjects could be led either further to optimality or closer to it.​[15]​  This possibility is an obvious avenue for future research.

5. Conclusion

Our experiment is the first to combine uncertain income and habit formation in a dynamic savings-consumption problem with a long finite horizon. There are four clear results. 

First, participants making savings decisions in the first sequence or two, with no chance to learn from experience or from outcomes of others, perform very badly. They spend too much and save too little. As a result, they do not have enough cash-on-hand to buffer income shocks, and their early spending creates a high level of habit which exerts a negative internality on future utilities. To the extent that this condition—the first two sequences of the no-social-learning condition—are like the problem people face in living their one life (barring reincarnation), then the results suggest that people save too little and end up much less happy than they should be. Adding even more lifelike features, such as the ability to borrow and uncertainty about the time of retirement and longevity, would probably make decisions even worse; this possibility remains to be studied in future research.

Second, individual learning brings spending patterns close to optima very rapidly (within about four ‘lifetime’ sequences). This was especially true in the group without social learning. As participants play more sequences, they gain more experience and make better spending decisions. The fact that near-optimal behavior can emerge in only a few sequences is in stark contrast to the slow trial-and-error learning shown by  Allen and Carroll (2001) who suggested that ‘a million years’ of experience is needed. Our results imply that people are engaged in a systematic procedure of individual learning which is more thoughtful than that simulated by Allen and Carroll. Precisely how this learning works is an important topic for future research.

Third, social learning was effective in bringing spending patterns towards optimality, rather quickly. Regression results indicate that, compared to the group without social learning, the presence of social learning caused a large 73% reduction in conditional deviations. Figures 5-6 showed that participants with social learning examples made better spending decisions than participants without social learning on their respective first sequences. The social learning group had a head start in figuring out what kind of spending behavior was optimal, rather than starting from scratch using trial and error. 

Fourth, behavioral models which assume that consumers spend a fixed fraction of their income or cash-on-hand (“rules of thumb”) fit much worse than models in which they spend a fraction of the conditionally optimal amount. So while consumers routinely overspend in early lifetimes in the treatment without social learning, simple rule-of-thumb models do not capture these mistakes. But another behavioral effect emerges very strongly: Subjects hate to make consumption choices which lead to negative utility points (they are averse to nominal losses). The relative ratios of actual utilities to conditionally optimal utilities, for gains and losses, is 2.63,  remarkably close to the 2-2.5 ratios derived from many other analyses of aversion to loss relative to desire for gain (e.g, Benartzi and Thaler, 1995). 
 
Implications and Future Directions for Research.

If university undergraduates in the experiments are not able to solve the complex mathematical models of intertemporal consumption without social learning and individual learning (especially Caltech students, who are chosen for extraordinary analytical skill, evidenced by median math SAT scores of 800), then it is even less plausible that average consumers in society can obtain these solutions. 

However, empirical evidence suggests that households do conform to optimal behavior described by the buffer stock savings model. This paper proposes ways in which consumers can exhibit good consumption behavior despite their mathematical limitations. Social learning and individual learning mechanisms may be the missing link. Experimental techniques are used to test these mechanisms and results show that spending decisions converge towards optimality once social and individual learning are added into the intertemporal consumption framework.

Even though the experimental results show that individual learning can cause rapid convergence towards the optimal, people only live one life. Therefore, social learning seems a more plausible explanation for why actual consumption decisions seem to have properties which are consistent with solutions to more realistic buffer-stock models. Consumers can, in principle, learn from a wealth of  sources. Learning from the experiences of family members, friends and/or financial advisors can all help spending decisions to converge towards optimality. If governments are concerned that their citizens are making sub-optimal spending decisions, they should start making such social learning resources more readily available to citizens.  

Similar experimental work can be done in the future. The ‘accelerated learning mechanism’ used in this experiment, in the form of life histories of successful, unsuccessful, and average participants, is just one way to implement social learning.  New techniques that reflect more accurately how social learning is actually conducted in society should be used (such as the “advice” paradigm of Schotter and Sopher, in press). Further research should also explore whether informational cascades form in intertemporal consumption when social learning is implemented. 

Obviously, future research should also use naturally-occurring empirical data to test the effect of social learning and individual learning on consumption decisions. For example, Lusardi (2002) finds that the presence of older siblings helps explain the propensity to think about retirement, which in turn is a strong predictor of precautionary savings. A wider range of social learning could be studied in the same way. 




References

Allen W. Todd, and Carroll D. Christopher (2001): ‘Individual Learning about Consumption,’. Macroeconomic Dynamics, 5(2), 

Angeletos, George-Marios, David Laibson, Andrea Repetto, Jeremy Tobacman, and Stephen Weinberg (2001): ‘The Hyperbolic Consumption Model: Calibration, Simulation, and Empirical Evaluation.’ Journal of Economic Perspectives., 15(3),47-68. 
 
Ballinger T. Parker, Palumbo G. Michael, and Wilcox T. Nathaniel (In press): Precautionary Savings in the Laboratory. Economic Journal. 

Benartzi, S. & Thaler, R. H.  (1995).  Myopic loss aversion and the equity premium puzzle.  Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 110(1) 73-92.

Bernheim, B. Douglas. (1998). “Financial illiteracy, education and retirement saving” In Olivia S. Mitchell and Sylvester J. Schieber (Eds.), Living with Defined Contribution Pensions, Pension Research Council, Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, pp 38-68.

Bowman, David; Deborah Minehart; and Matthew Rabin. (1999). "Loss Aversion in a Consumption-Savings Model", Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 38(2), 155-178.

Bikhchandani, Sushil, David Hirshleifer, and Ivo Welch (1998): ‘Learning from the Behavior of Others: Conformity, Fads and Informational Cascades,’ Journal of Economic Perspectives, 12(3),151-170. 

Cagetti, Marco (2003): ‘Wealth Accumulation over the Life Cycle and Precautionary Savings,’ Journal of Business and Economic Statistics. 21,339-353.
 
Camerer, C. F., Babcock, L., Loewenstein, G. & Thaler, R.  (1997).  Labor supply of New York City cab 
drivers:  One day at a time.  Quarterly Journal of Economics, 111, 408-441.

Camerer, C. F.  (2000).  Prospect theory in the wild: Evidence from the field.  In D. Kahneman & A. 
Tversky (eds.), Choices, values, and frames (pp. 288-300).  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  

Camerer, Colin F. (2003). Behavioral Game Theory. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Carroll, Christopher D. (1992): ‘Buffer Stock Saving: Some Macroeconomic Evidence.’ Brookings Papers on Economic Activity.61-156.

Carroll, Christopher D. (1997): ‘Buffer-Stock Saving and the Life Cycle/Permanent Income Hypothesis,’ Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112(1), 1-56

Carroll, Christopher D. (2001): ‘A Theory of the Consumption Function, With and Without Liquidity Constraints.’ Journal of Economic Perspectives, Symposium Paper on Consumption and Saving Behavior. 15(3).

Carroll, Christopher D., Jody Overland, and David N. Weil (2000): ‘Saving and Growth with Habit Formation.’ American Economic Review., 90 (3), 341-355.

Carroll, Christopher D.; Changyong Rhee, and Byungkun Rhee (1999). ``Does Cultural Origin Affect Saving Behavior? Evidence from Immigrants,'' Economic Development and Cultural Change, 48(1), 33-50,

Carroll, Christopher D., and David N. Weil (1994): ‘Saving and Growth: A Reinterpretation.’ Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, 40, 133-192.

Cochrane, John. (1989). “The Sensitivity of Tests of the Intertemporal Allocation of Consumption to Near-Rational Alternatives” American Economic Review 79 (June) 319-337.

Deaton, Angus (1992): Understanding Consumption.(Clarendon Lectures in Economics). Oxford University Press.

Deaton, Angus S. (1991): ‘Savings and Liquidity Constraints,’ Econometrica.59, 1221-1248.

Degeorge, F., Patel, J., & Zeckhauser, R.  (1999). Earnings management to exceed thresholds. Journal of 
Business, 72, 1-33.

Dusenberry, James S. (1949). Income, Savings, and the Theory of Consumer Behavior. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.

Fehr, Ernst, and Peter K. Zych (1998): ‘Do Addicts Behave Rationally?’ Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 100(3).643-662.

Fehr and Zych. (in press) Intertemporal choice under habit formation. In C. Plott and V Smith (Eds) Handbook of Experimental Economics Results, http://www.iew.unizh.ch/wp/iewwp043.pdf

Fehr, Ernst and Jean-Robert Tyran (2003). Limited rationality and strategic interaction—the impact of the strategic environment on nominal inertia. Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, University of Zürich, Working Paper No. 130. http://www.iew.unizh.ch/wp/iewwp130.pdf

Gale, Douglas (1996): ‘What have we learned from social learning?’ European Economic Review(40).

Genesove, D. & Mayer, C.  (2001).  Loss aversion and seller behavior:  Evidence from the housing 
market.  Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116(4), 1233-1260.   

Gourinchas, Pierre-Olivier, and Jonathan Parker (1999): ‘Consumption over the Life Cycle,’ Econometrica, 70, 47-89.

Hall, Robert E., and Frederic Mishkin (1982): ‘The sensitivity of Consumption to Transitory Income: Evidence from PSID Households,’ Econometrica, 50, 461-481.

Kahneman, D., Knetsch, J. L. & Thaler, R.  (1990).  Experimental tests of the endowment effect and the 
Coase theorem.  Journal of Political Economy, 98, 1325-1348. 

Kahneman, D. & Tversky, A.  (1979).  Prospect theory:  An analysis of decision under risk.  
Econometrica, 47, 263‑291.

Kandori, Michihiro (1997): ‘Evolutionary Game Theory in Economics,’ Chapter 8 in Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Theory and Applications, Volume I, edited by David Kreps, and W. Wallis. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Kotlikoff, Laurence J., Stephen Johnson, and William Samuelson (2001): ‘Can People Compute? An 
Experimental Test of the Life-Cycle Consumption Model. In L. J. Kotlikoff, Essays on Savings, Bequests, 
Altruism and Life-Cycle Planning. MIT Press.

Lettau, Martin, and Harald Uhlig (1999): ‘Rules of Thumb versus Dynamic Programming,’ American Economic Review (89)(1) 148-174.

Lusardi, Annamaria. Explaining why so many households do not save. Dartmouth working paper, December 2002.  http://www.dartmouth.edu/~alusardi/donotsave.pdf (​http:​/​​/​www.dartmouth.edu​/​~alusardi​/​donotsave.pdf​)

Mailath, George. (1998). Do people play Nash equilibrium? Lessons from evolutionary game theory. Journal of Economic Literature, 36, 1347-1374

Marimon, Ramon (1997): ‘Learning from Learning in Economics’ Chapter 9 in Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Theory and Applications, Volume I, edited by David Kreps, and W. Wallis. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

O'Doherty, J., Critchley, H.D., Deichmann, R.,Dolan R.J. Dissociating valence of outcome from behavioral control in human orbital and ventral prefrontal cortices. Journal of Neuroscience, in press.

Odean, T.  (1998).  Are investors reluctant to realize their losses?  Journal of Finance, 53(5), 1775-
1798. 

Samuelson, Larry (1997): Evolutionary Games and Equilibrium Selection. MIT Press, Cambridge.

Sargent, Thomas J. (1993): Bounded Rationality in Macroeconomics, Chapter 5. Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Schotter, Andrew and Barry Sopher. (in press).  Social Learning and Coordination Conventions in 
Inter-Generational Games: An Experimental Study. Journal of Political Economy.

Shafir, E., Diamond, P. & Tversky, A.  (1997).  Money illusion. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112(2), 
341-74.

Shefrin, H. M. & Thaler, R. H. (1992).  Mental accounting, saving, and self-control.  In G. 
Loewenstein & J. Elster (eds.), Choice over time (pp. 287-329).  New York:  Russell Sage 
Foundation.   


Souleles, Nicholas S. (1999): ‘The Response of Household Consumption to Income Tax Refunds,’ American Economic Review.89, 947-958.
 
Thaler, Richard H.  (1999).  Mental accounting matters.  Journal of Behavioral Decision Making,
12, 183-206.

Timmerman, Allan. (1993). How Learning in Financial Markets Generates Excess Volatility and Predictability in Stock Prices. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 108, 1135-1145.

Van De Stadt, Huib, A. Kapteyn, and S. Van De Geer (1985): ‘The Relativity of Utility: Evidence from Panel Data.’ Review of Economics and Statistics, 67(4).179-187.

Zeldes, Stephen P. (1989): ‘Optimal Consumption with Stochastic Income: Deviations from Certainty Equivalence,’ Quarterly Journal of Economics, 104, 275-298.




Figure 1: Optimal consumption in period 30


Figure 2: Optimal consumption in period 29


Figure 3: Optimal consumption in period 1

Figure 4: An Example Optimal Consumption Path


Figure 5:  Conditional deviations, sequence 1 and 7, without social learning

Figure 6: Average and 95% confidence intervals of conditional deviations, sequence 1 and 7, with social learning






Figure 7a: Actual (y) and conditionally optimal (x) utilities, only observations between -50 and +50



Figure 7b: Actual (y) and conditionally optimal (x) utilities, all observations 

 















Appendix: Instructions [These Appendices are not intended for publication; they are for the use of referees and will be posted on a web-based version of the paper.]

You are user___

Before we begin, there are two important rules. First, please don't speak to any other participant during the experiment. Second, please don't use the computer for any activity other than interacting with the software (e.g., email, or web-surfing). The reason for these rules is that we are interested in how you make economic decisions on your own. Talking to other people or using the computer for other activities makes it harder for us to learn about your decision making.  

What you need to know about this experiment.

In this experiment, we are interested in how you make your spending and saving decisions over a 30 period ‘lifetime’. The instructions will explain how the computer interface works. It will also explain how the decisions you make determine the amount of money you will earn. The money for the experiment has been provided by a research foundation. If you follow the instructions, and think carefully before making your decisions, you can earn a considerable amount of money. This will be paid to you in cash at the end of the experiment.

You will play 7 sequences of the 30 period spending/saving game.

There will be 7 sequences of the 30 period game. In each sequence you will make 30 decisions in a row. The average of your earnings from all 7 sequences will be calculated to determine the total amount you will earn at the end of the experiment. The game will be played on an Excel Workbook. Table A below shows an example of what the first period of one sequence might look like.

Period	Expected	Adjustment	Actual	Available	Lifestyle	Spending	Total	Points	
	Salary	Factor	Salary	Cash	Index	Choice	Savings	Obtained	
1	100.00	1.321	132.10	132.10	10.00			nil	Next Period
2	105.00								
3	110.25								
4	115.76								
5	121.55								
Table A (First period)

In Table A above, the row representing Period 1 is highlighted because the computer is waiting for you to make a decision about what to do in Period 1. After you make a decision in Period 1 (and click on the pink box labelled ‘Next Period’), the computer will record the decision and highlight the row for Period 2. After you have made decisions for all 30 periods in a sequence, you will see your total point earnings for that sequence at the bottom right corner, and an Orange box marked “Continue”. When you click on the “Continue” box you will begin the next 30-period sequence. 
 
Your total point earnings will be determined by a series of decisions about how much to spend from a sum of available cash. In each period you will have some cash available, which is the addition of what is left over from the previous period, and a new amount called “Actual salary”. The actual salary in each period is determined by multiplying two numbers—the expected salary, and a random adjustment factor. You will know the expected salary in advance (in fact, your computer screen will show the expected salary for all 30 periods in a sequence, and it is the same across all of the 10 sequences you will play). The adjustment factor will go up and down in each period in a way that we will explain about shortly.

Your Expected Salary grows by 5% each period.

The values of Expected Salary are shown for all thirty periods in the second column of the Table. Expected Salary increases at 5% each period. Therefore, if the first period’s expected salary is 100 as shown in the Table, then the second period’s expected salary: 100 x 1.05 = 105.00. The third period’s expected salary is: 105 x 1.05 = 110.25, and so forth for future periods. 

Your Expected Salary is susceptible to Adjustments.

The actual salary you get each period is determined by multiplying the expected salary by an Adjustment factor. You will experience both good and bad adjustments to your Expected Salary, because the Adjustment factor is often less than 1 (so that the actual salary is less than the expected salary), and the Adjustment factor is often also greater than 1 (so that the actual salary is more than the expected salary).  The exact adjustment factor in any one period is determined by a random draw from a probability distribution. The distribution is shown in the graph below, which may help you try to guess what Adjustment factors are most likely to occur. 

Adjustment Factor

The x-axis of the graph shows the possible adjustment factors (where 0 is the lowest possible factor). The y-axis shows how likely it is that an adjustment factor on the x-axis will actually randomly occur. Notice that the most common adjustment factors are less than one (because the curve is very tall for values on the x-axis between 0 and 1); but some of the adjustment factors are very large. This means that most of the time, your actual salary will be below your expected salary, but sometimes your actual salary will be much larger than your expected salary. In fact, half the time the adjustment factor will be below 0.607 and half the time the adjustment factor will be above 0.607.  About 10% of the time the adjustment factor will be very low, 0.168 or less, and about 10% of the time it will be very high, 2.185 or above. (In case you are curious, we can tell you that the statistical distribution of the adjustment factor is generated by taking a “normal” or “bell curve” distribution, then taking the mathematical constant “e” (which is roughly 2.718) raised to a power equal to the number drawn from the bell curve distribution.) 

Note also that each adjustment factor is statistically independent of the factors in early periods. This means that whether the factor is particularly high or low does not depend on whether it was high or low in the previous periods. 

Table B below shows three example sequences of 30 adjustment factors (Sequence A, B and C), randomly drawn using the above-described distribution.

 	Sequence A	 	Sequence B	 	Sequence C
Period	Adjustment Factors	 	Adjustment Factors	 	Adjustment Factors
1	1.364	 	0.845	 	0.624
2	0.461	 	2.464	 	2.660
3	0.498	 	0.403	 	2.643
4	0.223	 	0.199	 	1.298
5	0.323	 	0.413	 	0.840
6	0.108	 	0.296	 	0.389
7	0.283	 	0.199	 	0.530
8	0.588	 	0.926	 	2.592
9	4.793	 	1.989	 	0.599
10	0.780	 	1.601	 	1.246
11	2.721	 	0.230	 	0.674
12	0.334	 	1.270	 	0.159
13	2.203	 	0.715	 	1.586
14	1.363	 	0.404	 	0.129
15	0.289	 	0.100	 	0.471
16	0.194	 	0.170	 	0.309
17	0.369	 	0.426	 	0.364
18	1.296	 	0.604	 	0.703
19	0.256	 	0.248	 	1.120
20	0.308	 	1.033	 	0.219
21	0.767	 	1.441	 	0.780
22	0.671	 	0.910	 	0.049
23	0.578	 	0.198	 	0.486
24	0.956	 	1.665	 	0.446
25	2.000	 	1.636	 	0.265
26	1.782	 	0.174	 	0.549
27	0.140	 	0.482	 	0.276
28	0.384	 	0.342	 	0.406
29	0.087	 	0.929	 	0.457
30	1.692	 	1.625	 	0.367
Table B 

Please note that these sequences of Adjustment Factors are only examples of what a sequence of 30 adjustment factors might look like; the actual sequences of adjustment factors you will get in your experiment will be different, even though the underlying probability distribution from which it was drawn is the same. 

Period	Expected 	Adjustment 	Actual 	Available 	Lifestyle 	Spending 	Total 	Points 	
 	Salary	Factor	Salary	Cash	Index	Choice	Savings	Obtained	
1	100.00	1.321	132.10	132.10	10.00	60.00	72.10	38.49	
2	105.00	0.345	36.23	108.33	67.00	 	 	nil 	Next Period
3	110.25	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
4	115.76	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
5	121.55	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Table C (Second Period)

Actual Salary = Expected Salary multiplied by Adjustment Factor.

Each period, the Actual Salary is equal to the Expected Salary in that period times the Adjustment Factor. For example, in Table C, the Actual Salary in period 1 is given by: 100 x 1.321 = 132.10. A low adjustment factor in period 2 (0.345) means that the Actual Salary in that period is only 36.23, which is much lower than the Expected Salary of 105.00. Keep in mind that these adjustment factors are just examples. When you participate in the experiment and make your own decisions, the adjustment factors will probably be different. 

Available Cash = Last Period’s Savings + Current Period’s Actual Salary.

Remember that the one decision you must make in each period is how much of your available cash to spend. In Table C, suppose you decide to spend 60.00 in Period 1. The Total Savings for Period 1 is then your Available Cash (equal to Actual Salary because there was no past savings before Period 1) minus your Spending Choice, which is 132.10 – 60.00 = 72.10. Please note that you do not earn interest on Savings. 
In Period 2 of the Table above, your Actual Salary is 36.23. Therefore, your Available Cash for Period 2 is your Savings left over from Period 1, which was 72.10, plus your Actual Salary in period 2, which is 36.23. The total is 72.10 + 36.23 = 108.33, which will be automatically calculated for you and shown in the Available Cash Column. 

Spending earns you Points. Make your Spending Choice in the Yellow Box.

Enter your Spending Choice each period in the Yellow Box. For your spending decision, the corresponding Points Obtained will be shown in the Green Box.

In Table D below, entering a Spending decision of 60.00 in period 2 will show that you can get 25.18 points for that period. You can try out different levels of Spending before you make your final decision, by entering different values in the yellow Spending Choice box. Every time you input a value and press “enter” the computer will calculate how many Points Obtained you would get from that Spending Choice. 


Period	Expected 	Adjustment 	Actual 	Available 	Lifestyle 	Spending 	Total 	Points 	
 	Salary	Factor	Salary	Cash	Index	Choice	Savings	Obtained	
1	100.00	1.321	132.10	132.10	10.00	60.00	72.10	38.49	
2	105.00	0.345	36.23	108.33	67.00	60.00	48.33	25.18	Next Period
3	110.25	 	 	 	106.90	 	 	 	
4	115.76	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
5	121.55	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Table D

The number of Points Obtained also depends on your Lifestyle Index.

For each level of spending, the number of Points you earn is dependent on your Lifestyle Index. At a higher Lifestyle Index, you will earn a smaller amount of points for a given level of Spending than when you are at a lower Lifestyle Index. In Table D for example, the Lifestyle Index is at a higher level in Period 2 (67.00) than in Period 1 (10.00), therefore, the same level of spending of 60.00 yields a lower level of points in Period 2. 

A Point Transformation Table is placed on your desk. Table E below shows part of this Point Transformation Table. At each level of Lifestyle Index, it displays the number of points you can get at different levels of spending. 

Lifestyle Index
	-60	10	20	50	100	150	200	250	300
	5	-60.2	-190.3	-651.5	-1548.7	-2544.4	-3609.9	-4730.7	-5897.4
	10	3.2	-44.7	-214.2	-544.0	-910.0	-1301.7	-1713.7	-2142.6
	20	28.5	13.5	-39.6	-142.8	-257.4	-380.0	-508.9	-643.2
	40	36.7	32.5	17.5	-11.7	-44.0	-78.7	-115.1	-153.1
	60	38.5	36.5	29.6	16.0	1.0	-15.0	-31.9	-49.5
	80	39.1	38.0	34.0	26.2	17.6	8.4	-1.4	-11.5
Spending	100	39.4	38.7	36.1	31.1	25.5	19.5	13.2	6.6
Choice	120	39.6	39.1	37.3	33.7	29.8	25.6	21.2	16.6
	140	39.7	39.3	38.0	35.4	32.5	29.4	26.1	22.7
	160	39.8	39.5	38.5	36.4	34.2	31.8	29.3	26.7
	180	39.8	39.6	38.8	37.2	35.4	33.5	31.5	29.5
	200	39.9	39.7	39.0	37.7	36.3	34.7	33.1	31.4
	220	39.9	39.7	39.2	38.1	36.9	35.6	34.3	32.9
	240	39.9	39.8	39.3	38.4	37.4	36.3	35.2	34.0
	260	39.9	39.8	39.4	38.6	37.8	36.9	35.9	34.9
    Table E (Point Transformation Table)

As you can see, a Lifestyle index of 10 and a Spending choice of 60 gives you 38.5 points. However, if the Lifestyle Index is 50 and you spend the same level of 60, the Points Obtained will be at a lower level of 29.6. 

You are advised to look up this table before you make your Spending Choice. Alternatively, you can find out how many points you can earn by inputting different values of Spending in the Yellow Box. 

The Lifestyle Index grows with spending. 

In general, the Lifestyle Index for a period is calculated by taking the value of the Index from the previous period times .70, and adding in the previous period’s spending. For example, in Table D, the Lifestyle Index for Period 2 is calculated as shown:
0.7 * 10.00 (1st Period Lifestyle Index) + 60.00 (1st Period Spending) = 67.00.
Likewise, if spending is again 60.00 in the second period, the Lifestyle Index for Period 3 is: 0.7 * 67.00 (2nd Period Lifestyle Index) + 60.00 (2nd Period Spending) = 106.90
When you enter a Spending level each period, the Lifestyle Index for the next period will be automatically calculated and shown.

A Lifestyle Conversion Table is also provided on your desk. It shows you how your Lifestyle Index in the next period is dependent on how much you spend in the current period. Table F below shows part of this Lifestyle Conversion Table.

Lifestyle Index, Current Period
		10	20	50	100	150	200	250
	10	17	24	45	80	115	150	185
	20	27	34	55	90	125	160	195
	40	47	54	75	110	145	180	215
	60	67	74	95	130	165	200	235
	80	87	94	115	150	185	220	255
	100	107	114	135	170	205	240	275
Spending	120	127	134	155	190	225	260	295
Level,	140	147	154	175	210	245	280	315
Current	160	167	174	195	230	265	300	335
Period	180	187	194	215	250	285	320	355
	200	207	214	235	270	305	340	375
	220	227	234	255	290	325	360	395
	240	247	254	275	310	345	380	415
	260	267	274	295	330	365	400	435
	280	287	294	315	350	385	420	455
	300	307	314	335	370	405	440	475
	320	327	334	355	390	425	460	495
		 Table F (Lifestyle Conversion Table)

As you can see, choosing a Spending level of 60, when Lifestyle Index is 10, will result in a Lifestyle Index in the next period of 67. If you decide to spend more, for example 140, then your Lifestyle index for the next period will be at a higher level of 147. 

Note that the more you spend in the current period the higher will be your Lifestyle Index in future periods. But the Point Transformation Table (Table E) shows that for any particular level of spending, you earn fewer points if the Lifestyle Index is higher. So if you spend a lot in early periods, you will receive many points in those periods, but you also increase the Lifestyle Index for future periods, which will then reduce the points you obtain in future periods. 

You cannot spend more than your Available Cash.

Each period, you are not able to spend more than the Available Cash you have. If you choose a Spending level greater than the cash you have, the program will tell you to lower your spending.  
 
Proceed to the Next Period when you have made your Spending Choice.

Once you have thought carefully about how much to spend each period, proceed to the next period by using your mouse to click once on the Pink Box labelled ‘Next Period’. Please note that the program prevents you from returning to earlier periods to change your Spending Choice. Therefore, please be careful not to click the ‘Next Period’ box before you enter your spending decision, because you will not be able to return to change it. 

Once you have completed each 30 period sequence, proceed to the next sequence of 30 periods by clicking the ‘Continue’ Link, which will appear at the bottom right of your screen. 

Please note that the sequence of adjustment factors will be different in each of the 7 sequences, but the overall statistical distribution of possible adjustment factors will be the same. Once you have completed all 7 sequences, a screen will appear to tell you your overall points obtained from all 7 sequences.   

Do not leave any Yellow Spending Box blank.

Please do not leave any Yellow Spending Box blank. When the yellow spending box is blank, there will be a ‘nil’ in the green Points Obtained box. This means that the computer is still waiting for you to enter your spending decision for that period. A severe penalty will be imposed if you leave any Yellow Spending Box blank. This will greatly reduce your earnings from the experiment. 

The computer will automatically spend all available cash in the last period of each sequence.

Available cash from one sequence will not be carried over to the next sequence. This means that the computer will be automatically spend all remaining available cash in period 30 of each sequence. 

How your earnings are determined.

After you make your Spending Choice each period, the Points you obtain that period, in addition to all points you obtain in previous periods will be tallied at the bottom of the screen. Some of the Point outcomes each period will be negative but your Total Points from each sequence should be positive.

The average of the Total Points you obtained from all seven sequences will be calculated and will be converted to cash at a rate:
100 points  = $1.50 (rounding up to nearest $0.25)
Your earnings from the experiment, in addition to the $5.00 show-up fee, will be paid to you in cash when you leave the laboratory. 

[The following section was only included in the “social learning” condition”, beginning with START HERE and ending at END HERE]

[START HERE]

Some more information 

Several subjects like yourselves played this ‘lifetime’ spending/saving game previously. Like you, they played 7 sequences of 30 periods. Each subject faced the same 7 sequences of Adjustment Factors, which were determined by the same statistical distribution used to determine your adjustment factors. The sequences of Adjustment Factors shown in Table G, H and I, which students encountered in their experiments yesterday, were randomly drawn from the same underlying probability distribution (explained above) that you will be facing today. 

Table G on your desk shows you the spending choices of the person who obtained the highest points across all 7 sequences in the previous experiment conducted. Table H shows you the spending choices of the person who obtained the lowest points across all 7 sequences. Table I is a table showing spending decisions from one sequence for one subject, chosen at random.  

The spending behaviour of other people shown in these tables may or may not be useful to you as you think about your own spending decisions. 

Keep in mind that the Adjustment Factors that you will face today have been randomly drawn again for your experiment. That means they will not be the same as the Adjustment Factors shown in the three Tables. 

[END HERE]

Here is a brief summary of what you need to know. 

You will be making decisions in 7 sequences of 30 periods. In each period you will have some available cash and will choose a level of spending. Remember that all 7 sequences are important in determining your overall cash earnings, because your earnings will depend on the Point average over all 7 sequences.

Expected Salary grows at about 5% each period. The Actual Salary that you get depends on a random adjustment factor that occurs during each period. These factors are randomly determined and the adjustment factor in one period does not depend on whether the previous period’s adjustment factor was high or low. The Available Cash you have during each period is the Actual Salary you get in the current period plus the level of Savings that was left over from the previous period.

The level of Points you can get during each period depends on the level of Spending you make, as well as your Lifestyle Index. More spending this period increases than Lifestyle Index for next period. A higher level of Lifestyle requires a higher level of spending than before to obtain the same level of points. The Point Transformation Table on your desk will give you a better idea on how this works.

Take as much time as you like to make your Spending decision in each period. Please note that your Spending level in each period cannot exceed the Available cash you have. Remember that you cannot go back to earlier periods to change your Spending Level once you have clicked on the ‘Next Period’ Box. Therefore, please make sure that you have correctly entered your final spending decision in the Yellow Spending Choice Box before proceeding to the next period. Please also make sure that the Yellow Spending box each period is not blank before you proceed to the next period. Be reminded that a blank spending box in any sequence will result in a severe penalty and your cash earnings will be significantly reduced. 

We have also provided Tables G, H and I for your reference. They show the spending decisions which led to the highest and lowest points earned previously, and also one random sequence of decisions.

The average of all the Total points you have obtained for all seven sequences will be calculated and converted to cash. Write down your cash earnings and raise your hand, the experimenter will come round to make sure you have correctly completed all seven rounds. If everything is in order, you will receive your cash earnings when you leave the laboratory. 

If these instructions were not clear to you, or you have a question of any sort, please raise your hand and sit quietly until the experimenter comes by to listen to your question. Don’t hesitate to ask for help because if you are confused or make a mistake, it could reduce your earnings. The answer to your question might also be helpful for others to hear; if it is, the experimenter will repeat your question out loud, and the answer, so everyone can hear them. 

If you don't have any questions, please attempt the short quiz on the following page before you start the experiment. These questions will test whether you have fully understood the instructions. Once you are done with the questions, raise your hand and the experimenter will come by to check your answers. If your answers are not right, the experimenter will give the correct answer and help you understand how the Tables and instructions should enable you to give the correct answers. 

You can only start the experiment when all your answers are correct.


Quiz

1)	If you spend 60.00 this period, and your Lifestyle Index is 50.00, how many points will you obtain?

Ans: _________________

2)	If you spend 80.00 this period, and your Lifestyle Index is 250, how many points will you obtain?

Ans: _________________

3)	If you spend 450.00 this period, and your Lifestyle Index is 700, how many points will you obtain?

Ans: __________________

4)	If you increase your spending level from 60.00 to 100.00, and your Lifestyle Index is 100.00, how many additional points will you get?

Ans: _________________

5)	Your Expected Salary in Period 2 is 150.00. The Adjustment factor is 0.500 in the same period. Total savings from period 1 was 40.00. How much Available Cash do you have in period 2?

Ans: _________________ 


6)	Your Lifestyle Index is 50 in period 1. If you decide to spend 60.00 in the same period, what would be the level of Lifestyle Index in Period 2?

Ans: _________________


7)	In period 20, your Lifestyle Index is 200.00. You decide to spend 120.00.
a)	How many points will you get?
b)	What will your Lifestyle Index be in Period 21?
     
       Ans: ______________________________________









Appe

Appendix 1: Experimental Interface
Period	Expected Salary	Adjustment Factor	Actual Salary	Available Cash	Lifestyle Index	Spending Choice	Total Savings	Points
 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 
1	100.00	0.766	76.57	76.57	10.00	 	 	nil	Next Period
2	105.00	 	 	 	 	 	 	 
3	110.25	 	 	 	 	 	 	 
4	115.76	 	 	 	 	 	 	 
5	121.55	 	 	 	 	 	 	 
6	127.63	 	 	 	 	 	 	 
7	134.01	 	 	 	 	 	 	 
8	140.71	 	 	 	 	 	 	 
9	147.75	 	 	 	 	 	 	 
10	155.13	 	 	 	 	 	 	 
11	162.89	 	 	 	 	 	 	 
12	171.03	 	 	 	 	 	 	 
13	179.59	 	 	 	 	 	 	 
14	188.56	 	 	 	 	 	 	 
15	197.99	 	 	 	 	 	 	 
16	207.89	 	 	 	 	 	 	 
17	218.29	 	 	 	 	 	 	 
18	229.20	 	 	 	 	 	 	 
19	240.66	 	 	 	 	 	 	 
20	252.70	 	 	 	 	 	 	 
21	265.33	 	 	 	 	 	 	 
22	278.60	 	 	 	 	 	 	 
23	292.53	 	 	 	 	 	 	 
24	307.15	 	 	 	 	 	 	 
25	322.51	 	 	 	 	 	 	 
26	338.64	 	 	 	 	 	 	 
27	355.57	 	 	 	 	 	 	 
28	373.35	 	 	 	 	 	 	 
29	392.01	 	 	 	 	 	 	 
30	411.61	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	0.00



Appendix 2: Habit Formation Table – to illustrate how habit stock evolved with current spending.

Calculates Lifestyle Index for Next Period
	 					LIFESTYLE INDEX, Current Period					
 	12	10	20	50	100	150	200	250	300	350	400	500	600	700	800	900
	10	17	24	45	80	115	150	185	220	255	290	360	430	500	570	640
	20	27	34	55	90	125	160	195	230	265	300	370	440	510	580	650
	40	47	54	75	110	145	180	215	250	285	320	390	460	530	600	670
	60	67	74	95	130	165	200	235	270	305	340	410	480	550	620	690
	80	87	94	115	150	185	220	255	290	325	360	430	500	570	640	710
	100	107	114	135	170	205	240	275	310	345	380	450	520	590	660	730
	120	127	134	155	190	225	260	295	330	365	400	470	540	610	680	750
	140	147	154	175	210	245	280	315	350	385	420	490	560	630	700	770
	160	167	174	195	230	265	300	335	370	405	440	510	580	650	720	790
	180	187	194	215	250	285	320	355	390	425	460	530	600	670	740	810
	200	207	214	235	270	305	340	375	410	445	480	550	620	690	760	830
	220	227	234	255	290	325	360	395	430	465	500	570	640	710	780	850
	240	247	254	275	310	345	380	415	450	485	520	590	660	730	800	870
	260	267	274	295	330	365	400	435	470	505	540	610	680	750	820	890
	280	287	294	315	350	385	420	455	490	525	560	630	700	770	840	910
	300	307	314	335	370	405	440	475	510	545	580	650	720	790	860	930
	320	327	334	355	390	425	460	495	530	565	600	670	740	810	880	950
Spending	340	347	354	375	410	445	480	515	550	585	620	690	760	830	900	970
Decision,	360	367	374	395	430	465	500	535	570	605	640	710	780	850	920	990
Current 	380	387	394	415	450	485	520	555	590	625	660	730	800	870	940	1010
Period	400	407	414	435	470	505	540	575	610	645	680	750	820	890	960	1030
	420	427	434	455	490	525	560	595	630	665	700	770	840	910	980	1050
	440	447	454	475	510	545	580	615	650	685	720	790	860	930	1000	1070
	460	467	474	495	530	565	600	635	670	705	740	810	880	950	1020	1090
	480	487	494	515	550	585	620	655	690	725	760	830	900	970	1040	1110
	500	507	514	535	570	605	640	675	710	745	780	850	920	990	1060	1130
	520	527	534	555	590	625	660	695	730	765	800	870	940	1010	1080	1150
	540	547	554	575	610	645	680	715	750	785	820	890	960	1030	1100	1170
	560	567	574	595	630	665	700	735	770	805	840	910	980	1050	1120	1190
	580	587	594	615	650	685	720	755	790	825	860	930	1000	1070	1140	1210
	600	607	614	635	670	705	740	775	810	845	880	950	1020	1090	1160	1230
	620	627	634	655	690	725	760	795	830	865	900	970	1040	1110	1180	1250



Appendix 3: Table to illustrate to participants how points depend on spending and habit stock.

Points Transformation Table

	 							Lifestyle Index							
 	-60	10	20	50	100	150	200	250	300	350	400	500	600	700	800
	5	-60.24	-190.30	-651.53	-1548.73	-2544.40	-3609.94	-4730.65	-5897.39	-7103.84	-8345.36	-10920.08	-13600.53	-16372.23	-19224.50
	10	3.15	-44.66	-214.21	-544.01	-910.02	-1301.71	-1713.69	-2142.58	-2586.07	-3042.45	-3988.91	-4974.24	-5993.11	-7041.61
	20	28.47	13.50	-39.57	-142.80	-257.36	-379.97	-508.92	-643.16	-781.98	-924.83	-1221.08	-1529.50	-1848.41	-2176.60
	40	36.74	32.51	17.51	-11.66	-44.04	-78.69	-115.13	-153.07	-192.30	-232.68	-316.40	-403.56	-493.70	-586.45
	60	38.49	36.53	29.57	16.04	1.02	-15.05	-31.95	-49.55	-67.74	-86.46	-125.30	-165.72	-207.52	-250.54
	80	39.13	38.00	34.01	26.23	17.60	8.36	-1.36	-11.47	-21.93	-32.69	-55.01	-78.25	-102.28	-127.00
	100	39.44	38.71	36.11	31.07	25.47	19.48	13.18	6.62	-0.16	-7.14	-21.61	-36.68	-52.26	-68.29
	120	39.61	39.09	37.28	33.74	29.82	25.63	21.21	16.62	11.87	6.98	-3.16	-13.72	-24.63	-35.87
	140	39.71	39.33	37.99	35.37	32.48	29.37	26.11	22.71	19.20	15.59	8.09	0.28	-7.79	-16.09
	160	39.78	39.48	38.45	36.44	34.21	31.82	29.31	26.70	24.00	21.22	15.45	9.45	3.24	-3.15
	180	39.82	39.59	38.77	37.18	35.41	33.52	31.53	29.45	27.31	25.11	20.53	15.77	10.85	5.78
	200	39.86	39.67	39.00	37.71	36.27	34.73	33.12	31.43	29.69	27.90	24.18	20.32	16.32	12.20
	220	39.88	39.72	39.17	38.10	36.91	35.64	34.30	32.90	31.46	29.98	26.90	23.69	20.38	16.97
	240	39.90	39.77	39.30	38.40	37.40	36.33	35.20	34.02	32.81	31.56	28.97	26.27	23.48	20.61
	260	39.91	39.80	39.41	38.64	37.78	36.86	35.90	34.90	33.86	32.80	30.58	28.28	25.90	23.45
	280	39.93	39.83	39.49	38.82	38.08	37.29	36.46	35.60	34.70	33.78	31.87	29.88	27.82	25.71
	300	39.94	39.85	39.55	38.97	38.33	37.64	36.91	36.16	35.38	34.57	32.91	31.17	29.38	27.53
Spending	325	39.94	39.87	39.62	39.12	38.57	37.98	37.37	36.72	36.06	35.37	33.95	32.47	30.94	29.36
	350	39.95	39.89	39.67	39.24	38.77	38.26	37.73	37.17	36.60	36.00	34.78	33.50	32.18	30.82
	375	39.96	39.90	39.71	39.34	38.93	38.48	38.02	37.53	37.03	36.51	35.44	34.33	33.18	31.99
	400	39.96	39.92	39.75	39.42	39.06	38.67	38.26	37.83	37.39	36.93	35.99	35.01	34.00	32.96
	425	39.97	39.93	39.78	39.49	39.16	38.82	38.45	38.08	37.68	37.28	36.45	35.58	34.68	33.76
	450	39.97	39.93	39.80	39.54	39.25	38.94	38.62	38.28	37.93	37.57	36.83	36.05	35.25	34.43
	475	39.97	39.94	39.82	39.59	39.33	39.05	38.76	38.46	38.14	37.82	37.15	36.46	35.74	34.99
	500	39.98	39.95	39.84	39.63	39.39	39.14	38.88	38.61	38.32	38.03	37.43	36.80	36.15	35.48
	550	39.98	39.96	39.87	39.69	39.50	39.29	39.07	38.85	38.61	38.37	37.87	37.35	36.81	36.26
	600	39.98	39.96	39.89	39.74	39.58	39.40	39.22	39.03	38.83	38.63	38.21	37.77	37.32	36.86
	650	39.99	39.97	39.90	39.78	39.64	39.49	39.34	39.17	39.01	38.83	38.47	38.10	37.72	37.32
	700	39.99	39.97	39.92	39.81	39.69	39.56	39.43	39.29	39.14	38.99	38.68	38.36	38.03	37.69
	750	39.99	39.98	39.93	39.83	39.73	39.62	39.50	39.38	39.25	39.12	38.85	38.57	38.28	37.98
	800	39.99	39.98	39.94	39.85	39.76	39.66	39.56	39.45	39.34	39.23	38.99	38.74	38.49	38.23
	850	39.99	39.98	39.94	39.87	39.79	39.70	39.61	39.52	39.42	39.32	39.11	38.89	38.66	38.43









Appendix 4: Social Learning Information Table G (Highest Points Case)

Period	Expected Salary	Adjustment Factor	Actual Salary	Available Cash	Lifestyle Index	Spending Choice	Total Savings	Points Obtained	
1	100.00	1.115	111.46	111.46	10.00	20.00	91.46	28.47	
2	105.00	0.417	43.74	135.19	27.00	30.00	105.19	21.69	
3	110.25	0.177	19.53	124.72	48.90	42.00	82.72	20.02	
4	115.76	0.175	20.32	103.04	76.23	50.00	53.04	15.51	
5	121.55	0.350	42.54	95.58	103.36	45.00	50.58	-3.07	
6	127.63	0.111	14.16	64.74	117.35	50.00	14.74	-1.10	
7	134.01	2.404	322.14	336.88	132.15	79.00	257.88	20.28	
8	140.71	1.138	160.07	417.95	171.50	93.00	324.95	20.35	
9	147.75	1.642	242.62	567.57	213.05	106.00	461.57	20.24	
10	155.13	2.397	371.88	833.45	255.14	118.00	715.45	20.11	
11	162.89	0.445	72.44	787.89	296.60	130.00	657.89	20.28	
12	171.03	3.572	611.01	1268.90	337.62	140.00	1128.90	20.08	
13	179.59	0.490	87.95	1216.84	376.33	150.00	1066.84	20.18	
14	188.56	0.186	35.01	1101.86	413.43	159.00	942.86	20.22	
15	197.99	0.157	31.01	973.86	448.40	167.00	806.86	20.20	
16	207.89	0.483	100.32	907.18	480.88	173.00	734.18	19.91	
17	218.29	1.148	250.61	984.79	509.62	180.00	804.79	20.08	
18	229.20	0.689	157.88	962.68	536.73	186.00	776.68	20.13	
19	240.66	0.483	116.26	892.94	561.71	191.00	701.94	20.08	
20	252.70	0.628	158.80	860.74	584.20	197.00	663.74	20.36	
21	265.33	0.909	241.25	905.00	605.94	200.00	705.00	20.08	
22	278.60	0.712	198.49	903.48	624.16	204.00	699.48	20.15	
23	292.53	0.132	38.69	738.17	640.91	207.00	531.17	20.09	
24	307.15	0.921	282.95	814.13	655.64	210.00	604.13	20.12	
25	322.51	0.428	138.11	742.23	668.95	300.00	442.23	29.94	
26	338.64	3.795	1285.07	1727.31	768.26	350.00	1377.31	31.25	
27	355.57	1.884	669.83	2047.14	887.78	500.00	1547.14	34.88	
28	373.35	0.081	30.39	1577.53	1121.45	500.00	1077.53	33.22	
29	392.01	0.435	170.67	1248.21	1285.01	500.00	748.21	32.02	Total Points
30	411.61	0.509	209.37	957.58	1399.51	957.58	0.00	37.58	643.37



Appendix 5: Social Learning Information Table H (Lowest Points Case)

Period	Expected Salary	Adjustment Factor	Actual Salary	Available Cash	Lifestyle Index	Spending Choice	Total Savings	Points Obtained	
									
1	100.00	2.327	232.73	232.73	10.00	180.00	52.73	39.82	
2	105.00	0.505	53.07	105.80	187.00	80.00	25.80	10.81	
3	110.25	0.996	109.81	135.61	210.90	90.00	45.61	13.16	
4	115.76	0.227	26.31	71.92	237.63	70.00	1.92	-10.36	
5	121.55	1.097	133.39	135.31	236.34	100.00	35.31	14.93	
6	127.63	0.196	25.02	60.33	265.44	60.00	0.33	-37.31	
7	134.01	0.982	131.60	131.93	245.81	120.00	11.93	21.59	
8	140.71	0.375	52.83	64.76	292.06	60.00	4.76	-46.71	
9	147.75	0.652	96.33	101.09	264.45	100.00	1.09	11.31	
10	155.13	0.204	31.67	32.76	285.11	30.00	2.76	-269.71	
11	162.89	2.474	403.03	405.80	229.58	400.00	5.80	38.43	
12	171.03	0.087	14.95	20.74	560.70	20.00	0.74	-1406.97	
13	179.59	0.502	90.18	90.92	412.49	90.00	0.92	-20.03	
14	188.56	0.405	76.30	77.22	378.75	70.00	7.22	-48.10	
15	197.99	0.097	19.25	26.47	335.12	20.00	6.47	-740.23	
16	207.89	0.213	44.19	50.66	254.59	20.00	30.66	-521.02	
17	218.29	0.118	25.76	56.42	198.21	50.00	6.42	-37.08	
18	229.20	1.567	359.14	365.56	188.75	300.00	65.56	37.80	
19	240.66	0.963	231.71	297.27	432.12	120.00	177.27	3.77	
20	252.70	0.206	51.96	229.24	422.49	200.00	29.24	27.08	
21	265.33	3.046	808.21	837.45	495.74	600.00	237.45	38.23	
22	278.60	3.590	1000.09	1237.53	947.02	1100.00	137.53	38.85	
23	292.53	1.161	339.75	477.29	1762.91	400.00	77.29	21.82	
24	307.15	0.175	53.63	130.92	1634.04	130.00	0.92	-112.83	
25	322.51	0.982	316.58	317.50	1273.83	250.00	67.50	8.74	
26	338.64	1.383	468.36	535.86	1141.68	350.00	185.86	25.93	
27	355.57	1.124	399.64	585.50	1149.18	450.00	135.50	31.39	
28	373.35	0.611	228.27	363.77	1254.42	250.00	113.77	9.31	
29	392.01	0.231	90.59	204.36	1128.10	200.00	4.36	-1.99	Total Points
30	411.61	2.839	1168.66	1173.03	989.67	1173.03	0.00	38.93	-2820.43
Appendix 6: Social Learning Information Table I (Random Points Case)

Period	Expected Salary	Adjustment Factor	Actual Salary	Available Cash	Lifestyle Index	Spending Choice	Total Savings	Points Obtained	
 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
1	100.00	1.381	138.09	138.09	10.00	20.00	118.09	28.47	
2	105.00	1.385	145.40	263.49	27.00	30.00	233.49	21.69	
3	110.25	1.195	131.71	365.20	48.90	35.00	330.20	11.91	
4	115.76	0.615	71.25	401.44	69.23	60.00	341.44	24.59	
5	121.55	0.298	36.23	377.67	108.46	65.00	312.67	17.34	
6	127.63	1.168	149.08	461.75	140.92	70.00	391.75	13.10	
7	134.01	0.131	17.60	409.36	168.65	100.00	309.36	23.28	
8	140.71	0.417	58.62	367.97	218.05	100.00	267.97	17.24	
9	147.75	0.487	71.89	339.86	252.64	90.00	249.86	6.67	
10	155.13	1.745	270.63	520.49	266.85	120.00	400.49	19.68	
11	162.89	1.870	304.53	705.02	306.79	260.00	445.02	34.76	
12	171.03	0.867	148.37	593.39	474.75	180.00	413.39	21.71	
13	179.59	1.723	309.35	722.74	512.33	200.00	522.74	23.72	
14	188.56	0.187	35.29	558.03	558.63	230.00	328.03	26.29	
15	197.99	1.345	266.38	594.41	621.04	200.00	394.41	19.49	
16	207.89	1.037	215.56	609.96	634.73	220.00	389.96	22.55	
17	218.29	0.780	170.18	560.14	664.31	230.00	330.14	23.12	
18	229.20	0.825	189.09	519.24	695.02	250.00	269.24	24.89	
19	240.66	0.531	127.77	397.01	736.51	160.00	237.01	0.93	
20	252.70	0.261	65.99	302.99	675.56	155.00	147.99	2.51	
21	265.33	0.032	8.49	156.49	627.89	145.00	11.49	0.85	
22	278.60	0.144	40.00	51.49	584.52	50.00	1.49	-242.21	
23	292.53	1.037	303.39	304.88	459.17	170.00	134.88	20.33	
24	307.15	0.171	52.50	187.37	491.42	110.00	77.37	-10.11	
25	322.51	0.198	64.01	141.39	453.99	100.00	41.39	-14.87	
26	338.64	0.891	301.76	343.15	417.79	150.00	193.15	17.53	
27	355.57	0.885	314.70	507.85	442.46	200.00	307.85	26.34	
28	373.35	0.235	87.68	395.53	509.72	190.00	205.53	22.09	
29	392.01	0.982	384.84	590.37	546.80	300.00	290.37	32.10	Total Points
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^1	  Note that while many aspects of savings are consistent with the new precautionary-savings models, there are plenty of other anomalies.  For example, marginal propensities to save and consume vary across categories of income (Shefrin and Thaler, 1992; Souleles, 1999); and some empirical facts are consistent with a model in which people are loss-averse toward drops in consumption (e.g., Bowman, Minehart, Rabin, 1999 and Figures 7a-b below). 
^2	  See recent surveys by Gale (1996), Samuelson (1997), Michihiro (1997), Mailath (1998) and Camerer (2003, chapter 6).
^3	  Surveys by Sargent (1993) and Marimon (1997).
^4	  E.g., Timmerman (1994), Arthur et al. (1997) and Lettau (1997).
^5	  Several empirical papers have argued that habits might be important in determining consumption. A pioneering modern paper is Dusenberry (1949). More recent papers include Van de Stadt et al. (1985), and Carroll and Weil (1994). 
^6	  For an application of a richer approach with two-piece hyperbolic discounting, see Angeletos et al (2001). 
^7	  We use  where is the upper asymptote of utility (since ρ=3 so the second term is negative),  is a scaling parameter, and bounds the utility function from below (it can be thought of as a flow of consumption people receive regardless of their spending). In the experiments,  = 2.7, which is similar to Ballinger et al. (1998). Scaling factors were θ = 750 and k=40. 
^8	  That is,, xt = Xt/Pt, ct = Ct/ Pt, ht-1 = H t-1/Pt and ε = /Pt. This normalization reduces the number of state variables from three to two, by eliminating the permanent income variable.
^9	  The exchange rates were US $1.50 for every 100 experimental points in Caltech, and US $2.50 in Singapore (using an exchange rate of US $1 ≈ Sing $1.70).
^10	  Experiments were conducted on 30/09/02 and 01/10/02 for NUS students, and on 09/01/03 for Caltech students. 
^11	  Note that in some cases, the average subject does better than the unconditional or conditional optimum (i.e., the deviation from optimality is positive). This can happen if participants overspend but get lucky and have good income shocks in later periods. 
^12	  A total of 72 players played 7 sequences of 30 periods each. However, period 30 of each sequence is eliminated because the computer software automatically spends all available cash (which is the optimal choice). Consequently, the total number of observations used is equal to 72 x 7 x 29 = 14,616. 
^13	  There are large cross-national differences in savings rates, and savings in many Asian countries are among the highest in the world (see e.g., Carroll, Rhee, Rhee, 1999). 
^14	  Subjects know their earnings depend on their point total from 30x7=210 separate periods. Thus, explaining the aversion to losses requires an auxiliary assumption that participants segregate each period from the other in their “mental accounting” (Thaler, 1999), or “isolate decisions”, as been observed in many other domains (see Camerer, 2000).  
^15	  Cf. experimental work on money illusion by  Shafir, Diamond and Tversky  (1997) and Fehr and Tyran (2003).
